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 Ludger Kühnhardt 
African Regional Integration and the 
Role of the European Union 
I. 
African regional integration has had a remarkable new beginning since the 
formal beginning of the African Union (AU) in 2002. Following the Treaty 
of Abuja, in force since 2004 and envisaging an African Economic Com-
munity in six stages by 2028, and following the New Partnership for Af-
rica’s Development (NEPAD), since 2002 a mandated initiative of the 
African Union including NEPAD’s unique African Peer Review Mecha-
nism for the measuring of good governance, the African Union has become 
the frame for a new African regionalism. The new beginning in African 
integration is impressive, promising and creative. It is not only a rhetoric 
operation but a substantial recognition of the need to redefine the parame-
ters of political, socio-economic and security developments on the African 
continent.
1  
The independence of African nation-states was accompanied and supported 
by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963. The OAU 
was driven by an anti-colonial impulse and aimed at protecting the national 
sovereignty of each African state. To prevent a revision of borders, often 
drawn artificially during the age of colonialism, was a prime concern of the 
OAU. Non-intervention into domestic affairs became the main application 
of the principle of protecting national sovereignty. The OAU failed to link 
 
1   See David Bach, „The Global Politics of Regionalism: Africa“, in: Mary Farrell, 
et.al.(eds.), Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice, London: Pluto 
Press 2005: 171-186. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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the principle of national sovereignty with the principle of popular sover-
eignty that is with the principles of human rights, rule of law, democratic 
accountability and good governance. The economic decline in Africa be-
tween the 1970s and 1990s became an almost all-pervasive stereotype that 
was reinforced by the sad realities of civil wars and failed states, failing 
regimes and widely spread bad governance. For some, Africa was already 
considered a lost continent.
2 Until the turn of the century, Africa’s image in 
the world became blurred by negative stereotypes and widely perceived 
experiences of frustration and decline. The positive examples of some Afri-
can success stories did not serve as model for other countries. In fact the 
positive examples became the sad exceptions to a rule of decline and disas-
ter. 
Amidst of the African crisis, a new beginning became inevitable. The term 
“African Renaissance”, introduced by South Africa’s President Thabo 
Mbeki, became the proud expression of a new vision.
3 It was echoed by 
initiatives to better link economic development, social stability and politi-
cal security with the need to redefine Africa’s own responsibility and a 
stronger popular ownership in the future of the continent. If Africa was to 
have a better future, its people would need to materially benefit and its 
leaders ought to take their responsibility seriously. Inevitably, the deficit 
analysis had to address the issue of governance and hence the structural 
deficits of weak states and fragmented nations. Africa had to discover the 
concept of regional integration as a means to give the continental develop-
ment a new and promising perspective. 
When Libya’s leader Muammar Gaddafi launched the initiative to replace 
the Organization of African Unity by the African Union in 1999, he also 
had in mind his personal ambition and that of his country. But an objective 
reality evolved, namely the consensual recognition of real regional integra-
 
2   See Mir A. Ferdowsi (ed.), Afrika – Ein verlorener Kontinent?, Munich: Wilhelm 
Fink, 2004. 
3   Thabo Mbeki, The African Renaissance, South Africa and the World, Speech at the 
United Nations University, Tokyo, April 9, 1998, online at: 
www.unu.edu/unupress/mbeki.html; for an academic analysis see Fantu Cheru, Af-
rican Renaissance: Roadmaps to the Challenge of Globalization, London/New 
York: Zed Books, 2002. African Regional Integration and the Role of the 
European Union 
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tion as the frame for a new beginning in Africa’s development. This con-
sensus was based on a notion of African unity that was no longer related to 
an anti- or post-colonial definition of Pan-Africanism. For the century 
ahead, Pan-Africanism was to be achieved by means of regional integra-
tion.  
The result was an almost frantic institution-building in the shortest possible 
period of time, often without clear focus and more often without a solid 
understanding of the need for deepening integration if region-building was 
to make sense and eventually become solid. Africa opted for a territorially 
inclusive way of coming together. Except for Morocco, all African states 
joined the African Union. The array of seventeen formal structures of the 
African Union as outlined in the Constitutive Act of the AU is impressive.
4 
Most noticeable are:  
•  The AU’s President’s Assembly (Article 7), its supreme body, which 
meets once a year and takes decisions by consensus or two-third ma-
jority on substantial matters and by a simple majority on procedural 
matters. 
•  The AU’s Executive Council consisting of the Foreign Ministers of 
the African Union and deciding on regular matters from foreign trade 
to communications and foreign policy. 
•  The Pan-African Parliament is located in Midrand, composed of rep-
resentatives from across the continent and active since 2004. 
•  The AU Commission is based in Addis Ababa and is composed of 
ten commissioners (Chairman since 2008: Jean Ping of Gabon). Its 
secretariat is responsible for co-coordinating the activities and meet-
ings of the African Union. 
•  The AU Permanent Representatives Committee (Article 3) is com-
posed of nominated permanent representatives of the member state 
governments. It prepares the work for the Executive Council. 
 
4   African Union, The Constitutive Act of the AU, online at: Africa-
union.org/About_AU/AbConstitutive_Act.htm. Ludger Kühnhardt 
6   
•  The African Court of Justice has been mandated to primarily rule on 
human right matters in Africa. Over time, it shall merge with the 
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, currently seated in 
Arusha, whose first eleven judges were elected on January 22, 2006, 
by the Executive Council of the AU.  
•  The AU Peace and Security Council is designed to be responsible for 
monitoring and intervening in conflicts and is intended to have an 
AU peacekeeping force at its disposal. The Peace and Security 
Council was formally launched in Addis Ababa on May 25, 2004 
and received initial EU support of €250 million for its peacekeeping 
facility. 
•  The AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council serves in an advi-
sory capacity and is composed of representatives from professions 
and civil society. 
•  The financial Institutions of the AU include the African Central 
Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank. 
In sharp contrast with past experiences, Article 30 of the Constitutive Act 
of the African Union defines the procedure to suspend membership in the 
AU in clear words: “Governments which shall come to power through un-
constitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of 
the Union.”
5 
In spite of the impressive wording of the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union and several subsequent documents related to matters of African gov-
ernance, the normative principles of the factual operations of the African 
Union remained unclear. Bigger, to this day, is the gap between declared 
principles and operational procedures on the one hand and means of ener-
getic and coherent implementation of principles and objectives on the other 
hand. The biggest uncertainty, however, exists in defining the relationship 
between the objectives of the African Union and the aspiration of manifold 
regional integration groupings across the African continent. The overlap of 
membership looks like an image of the solar system – and it echoes a situa-
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tion of a map that was painted before the discovery of how things shown on 
the map may work.
6    
The multiplication of regional groupings across Africa has not been a new 
phenomenon. With the New Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD), they have been streamlined, in a way. Currently, eight regional 
groupings in Africa have been designated as building-blocks for the devel-
opment of an African Economic Community (AEC) by 2028: The Arab 
Maghreb Union (AMU, headquartered in Rabat), the Economic Communi-
ty of West African States (ECOWAS, headquartered in Abuja), the Eco-
nomic Community of Central African States (ECCAS, headquartered in 
Libreville), the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA, 
headquartered in Lusaka), the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC, headquartered in Gaborone), the Intergovernmental Authority for 
Development (IGAD, headquartered in Djibouti), the Community of Sahe-
lo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD, headquartered in Tripoli) and the East Afri-
can Community (EAC, headquartered in Arusha). So far, none of these 
regional groupings has been able to fully bridge the gap between aspiration 
and reality.
7 
But it is fair to recognize that Africa has moved to more shared responsibil-
ity and to policies of non-indifference about what is going on across the 
continent. Two trends have become noticeable since the early 1990s: 
 
6   See African Union Commission (ed.), Rationalization of the Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs): Review of the Abuja Treaty and Adoption of Minimum Inte-
gration Programme, Addis Abeba: African Union, 2007: This important and stimu-
lating study provides options for the rationalization of the regional economic 
communities in Africa. The study tends however to underestimate the need for firm 
criteria in order to implement policy decisions and it is focused on economic and 
technical matters, thus neglecting the political and legal issues discussed in this es-
say. All in all, the assumption that integration can be optimized through mechanistic 
technical processes must arouse scepticism when taking into account the unpredict-
able political dependency of any integration progress.   
7   On the current formal situation of regional economic integration across Africa see 
ECA, Regional Economic Integration in Africa, in: Philippe de Lombaerde (ed.), 
Multilateralism, Regionalism and Bilateralism in Trade and Investment: 2006 
World Report on Regional Integration, Dordrecht: Springer, 2006: 127-157. Ludger Kühnhardt 
8   
•  On the regional level, the existing regional integration systems expe-
rienced a general overhaul with strong emphasis on economic devel-
opment and functional deepening, including in the sphere of security 
and parliamentary representation. 
•  On the continental level, the goal for African unity became more po-
liticized and institutionalized while being broadened through me-
chanisms of functional deepening; simultaneously the limits of 
autonomous claims to national sovereignty as the highest goal of 
statehood were increasingly recognized and the notion of protecting 
human rights won ground over the stereotypical claim of non-
interference in domestic affairs of individual African countries. 
So far, African leaders have not been able to define a coherent sequencing 
of the work ahead of the eight regional groupings or of their possible even-
tual merger with the African Union. As much as regional integration in its 
theoretical nature and its comparative dimension, the role of regional 
groupings in Africa and the issue of overlapping membership on the Afri-
can continent is under-researched. This fact also reflects the underdevel-
oped research potential of Africa. African institutions of regional 
integration lack human resources, and so does the academic sector across 
Africa. While the European Union is supported by more than 13,000 civil 
servants, the African Union counts 700 professionals. Their commitment 
and competence is beyond doubt. But their figure is simply too limited to 
cope with the rising expectations in any meaningful way. Human capacity-
building remains an integral necessity to enhance the quality and breadth of 
integration-building in Africa. Africa has an enormous need to increase 
academic training facilities. Together with African partners in Europe, 
comprehensive programs in tertiary education and further education pro-
grams dealing with matters of regional integration need to be launched.
8  
 
8   See Andreas Stamm, „Wissenschaftskooperation: Neue Formen der Zusammenar-
beit mit Subsahara-Afrika,“ in: Stephan Klingebiel (ed.), Afrika-Agenda 2007: 
Ansatzpunkte für den deutschen G8-Vorsitz und die EU-Ratspräsidentschaft, Dis-
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II. 
The most simple question, yet rarely posed in Africa is as follows: why re-
gional integration at all? The prevailing trend among integration actors and 
integration analysts tends to focus on the technical question of how to make 
integration work. How integration may work depends on why integration 
should take place. Although regional integration, by and large, is a con-
structivist activity, integration is more than a technical operation. The tech-
nicalities of regional integration – including the question of how to measure 
regional integration progress – are relevant. But they still remain tools and 
should not be confused with the need to clarify the purpose of integration. 
In order to achieve integration objectives and to strengthen the legitimacy 
of region-building, clarity about normative preconditions, political objec-
tives and genuine goals of value added ought to be defined and regularly 
re-calibrated.   
The purpose of regional integration in the African context seems to be evi-
dent yet this question does not necessarily find coherent answers.
9 In light 
of the many failures of African development of the past three to four dec-
ades, it sometimes seems as if regional integration may be understood as 
the panacea to run away from this failed past. The overriding experience 
however of regional integration is the fact that weak states only produce 
weak integration. Strong regional integration requires solid, functioning 
and accountable national structures. Regional integration is no substitute 
for reforming the nation-state across Africa. Successful regional integration 
requires a solid preparation of each member state of a regional grouping.   
 
9    For some good academic answers see Keith Gottschalk/Siegmar Schmidt, “The 
African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development: Strong Institu-
tions for Weak States?, in: International Politics and Society 4(2004): 138-158;   
Lawrence O.C. Agubuzu, From the OAU to AU: The Challenges of African Unity 
and Development in the Twenty-First Century, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs, 2004;  Economic Commission for Africa (ed.), Assessing Regional 
Integration in Africa, Addis Abeba: Economic Commission for Africa, 2004; David 
J. Francis, Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems, Ashgate: 
Aldershot, 2006; Tesfaye Dinka/Walter Kennes, “Africa’s Regional Integration Ar-
rangements: History and Challenges”, in: ECDPM Discussion Paper No.74, Maas-
tricht: European Centre for Development Policy, 2007. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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The most comprehensive argument for region-building in Africa is twofold: 
Region-building is the reaction to the limits of autonomous state activities 
in generating and distributing public goods. At the same time, region-
building provides the means and the potential to enhance the actor-ness of 
Africa as a whole and of all of its societies and states in the age of global-
ization. Regional integration is about the pooling of limited resources and 
the advancement of distributing public goods under the global conditions of 
the twenty-first century. Peace and security, rule of law and political stabil-
ity, economic development and social inclusion – the long list of African 
challenges goes beyond the capacity of individual states. In order to in-
crease the sense of ownership and the degree of inclusivity of citizens in 
the life of Africa, regional integration provides an additional level of gov-
ernance and the management of public affairs. Region-building is about 
building up tools to better generate public goods and objectives for a more 
sustainable distribution of public goods. But region-building only works if 
it is law-based and driven by a common legislation.  
First and foremost, region-building is trust-driven. Without trust in the 
honesty, sincerity and objectives of one’s partner, no regional grouping can 
overcome the point of mutual suspicion. Up to a certain point, cooperation 
is possible even among adversaries. But genuine and deep trust-based re-
gion-building requires the mutual recognition of the regime of governance 
of all partners in a regional grouping. In order to do so, regime symmetry 
must be minimal at least and should be solid in order to carry region-
building efforts beyond the simple point of functional cooperation without 
deeper commitment. Because of this precondition for strong and real re-
gional integration, it is no surprise that to this day, no African regional 
grouping, the African Union including, has addressed the issue of a com-
mon legislation. Functioning institutions and working tools of integration 
are important – but eventually they make sense only as a consequence of 
regional integration commitment. The recognition of the objective of de-African Regional Integration and the Role of the 
European Union 
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mocratic region-building must define the starting point and the ultimate 
objective of sincere and sustainable regional integration processes.
10   
A European experience is telling: Central and South Eastern European 
countries have always belonged to Europe. But none of them joined the 
European Union before they had become functioning democracies and ac-
countable pluralistic states based on rule of law and market economy. Af-
rica has opted for territorial inclusivity as initial mode of region-building. 
The consequences are grave: The process toward deeper integration has 
become daunting and difficult. This does not mean that deep integration is 
impossible in a territorially united Africa. But it is only realistic to state 
that deeper integration will take more time and may eventually not be 
achieved as long as the plethora of different political systems across the 
continent prevails. The commitment of resources, the readiness to share 
decision-making and, eventually, the willingness to pass a mandate for ac-
tion into the hand of actors other than one’s national government requires 
trust which, in political terms, requires regime symmetry among partner 
countries. Luxembourg or Malta may be small European countries. But no-
body in the European Union would question the legitimacy of, let’s say, an 
EU Commissioner from one of these countries. His or her career has been 
based on the democratic system that prevails at home. His or her European 
mandate is embedded in the trust of all the other partners in the democratic 
legitimacy of his or her country of origin. Eventually, deep integration will 
require the readiness for common legislation and it will require the recogni-
tion of a common destiny. This universal insight holds also true for Africa 
and defines the current limits of the African Union. 
 
10  See Peter P. Waller, „Demokratische Renaissance in Afrika?“, in: Internationale 
Politik, 8 (1999): 49–54, online at: www.internationalepolitik.de/archiv/ jahr-
gang1999/download; Sven Grimm, „Europäische Demokratieförderung in den 
1990er Jahren,“ in: Sven Grimm, Die Afrikapolitik der Europäischen Union:  Eu-
ropas außenpolitische Rolle in einer randständigen Region, Hamburg: Institut für 
Afrika-Kunde, 2003: 138-192; Fatoumatta M’boge/ Sam Gbaydee Doe, “Overview 
of Civil Society in Africa”, in: Fatoumatta M’boge/ Sam Gbaydee Doe, African 
Commitments to Civil Society Engagement: A Review of Eight NEPAD Countries, 
Nairobi: African Human Security Initiative, 2004: 13-56.  Ludger Kühnhardt 
12   
The issue of deep integration is not a one-way-street. The further regional 
integration advances, the more does it affect policy areas beyond the origi-
nal scope of operation. The more it advances, the more likely it will affect 
the parameters of the domestic system of the constituent parts of a regional 
grouping. Integration strikes back: It impacts the political, economic, so-
cial, and most likely also the cultural and constitutional spheres of the 
member states of a regional grouping. The impact goes beyond the sphere 
of political and public actors and will eventually reach the daily life of citi-
zens. Therefore, integration must go hand in hand with an increase in own-
ership in a regional grouping. Regional citizenship is the logical 
consequence and regional citizen’ claim rights are, eventually, the inevita-
ble consequence of an advanced regional grouping. African regional inte-
gration will discover these inevitable implications of the path that has been 
redesigned with the creation of the African Union.  
It may well be that eventually it will not be the African Union but the most 
advanced and deep sub-regional groupings – the building blocs of an Afri-
can Economic Community – that may become African equivalents of the 
European Union. The African Union may continue to serve the prime ob-
jective of promoting African unity as a matter of identity and the external 
projection of African claims. But while the African Union may continue to 
represent the symbolic dimension of African unity, some of the building 
blocs of sub-regional groupings in Africa may evolve into the strong repre-
sentatives of deep region-building.  It is noteworthy, that those sub-regional 
groupings in Africa that have become most advanced in their structures, 
objectives and performances have broadened their agenda and refocused 
their priorities. They may not have become expressions of deep integration 
that encompasses regional legislation and the eventual pooling of political 
destiny. But they have undergone internal transformations and changes in 
priorities, sequencing and approach that has helped them to become much 
more comprehensive and all-encompassing compared with their initial am-
bition. So far, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and the South African Development Community (SADC) are 
the most successful examples of deepened integration among sub-regional 
groupings on the African continent. They represent the strongest potential African Regional Integration and the Role of the 
European Union 
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to continue on this path with sustained success. Over the course of the fol-
lowing years, they may be followed by the re-born East African Commu-
nity (EAC). These three building blocs of an African Economic 
Community are also the most differentiated, advanced and comprehensive 
regional groupings in today’s Africa. They may eventually mature into the 
African equivalents of the European Union – supranational entities hold 
together and advanced by a common body of legislature and a multi-level 
system of governance. In turn, the African Union may develop into a hy-
brid of the Council of Europe, the Organization of Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations – a collective security organ 
defined by the quest for a common identity and its global recognition. 
III. 
The African Union and the building blocs of the African Economic Com-
munity are the products of several crises in African unity and African de-
velopment. The new strategy of promoting African unity through African 
regional integration will surely experience crises in integration and, most 
likely, also new crises of integration. None of this must be disastrous as the 
European experience suggest. In fact, many crises in integration may be-
come turning points in advancing regional integration. Eventually, regional 
integration in Africa may be strengthened through the experience of crises. 
In fact, there is ample evidence to suggest that already by now, the devel-
opment of the African Union and the main building blocs across the Afri-
can continent have gone through genuine cycles of crisis and renewal, 
challenge and response. 
More than on any other continent, regional integration in Africa is linked to 
the development strategy of the continent. With the normative myth of Af-
rican unity as represented by the Organization of African Unity, also many 
of the assumptions of the African development strategy and, more impor-
tantly, of the Africa-specific development tools have been reconsidered. 
Several insights must be formulated even if they touch taboos or vested in-
terests in Africa and among the friends of Africa elsewhere. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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•  Aid-based development has not worked. Since the early 1960s, the 
African continent has received more than 1,000 billion $ of public 
development aid. This amount equals the transfer of public resources 
from West Germany to East Germany in the first decade after Ger-
man unification of 1990. Almost a generation later, in East Germany 
only pockets of sustainable development can maintain competitive-
ness in the globalized world. Since the opening of China under Deng 
Tsiao Ping in the late 1970s, the People’s Republic of China has re-
ceived approximately the same amount – 1000 billion $ - through an 
external resource transfer. Unlike in Africa and in Germany, the re-
source transfer in the Chinese case was not one of public aid. It was a 
resource transfer of private investment which has triggered remark-
able and sustainable economic growth – the key to make a country 
wealthy. The results have turned China from a basket case into a vi-
brant and new center of economic gravity with double digit growth 
rates for more than a decade, now rising to become an economic 
world power. 
•  Yet, the Chinese development model may not serve as a comprehen-
sive model for Africa. Africa does not share with the countries of 
Northeast Asia the strong economic nationalism that, at least up to a 
point, benefits from competition among the countries in the region. 
There is no African equivalent of the combination of China, Japan, 
Korea and the Southeast Asian tiger countries, at least not to this 
moment. Africa is different from Northeast Asian societies as far as 
the tradition and heritage of formal education and the pursuit of sys-
temic thinking are concerned. Historically, Africa’s traditions of 
education, by and large, were oral. Africa’s intuitive, often naturalis-
tic approach to life stands in contrast to the scripture-based sharp 
discipline and structure of form, function, authority, hierarchy and 
norms in Northeast Asia. The entrepreneurial spirit that is often asso-
ciated with the societies of Northeast Asia is not an African tradition. 
•  The most recent Chinese “discovery” of Africa provides new insights 
into the development potential of Africa and the problems of African African Regional Integration and the Role of the 
European Union 
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development.
11 China’s assertive investment strategy serves the pur-
pose of the rising Chinese economy. It also serves the African coun-
tries that can offer energy sources and raw materials which the 
Chinese need. It improves their infrastructure and thus provides an 
important frame for future development activities. It does, however, 
not serve those African countries that are not on the Chinese radar 
screen. Applying modes of mutually reinforcing self-interest can be a 
successful strategy if applied to Africa’s development. For Europe 
this means to go beyond development, aid, guilt and self-interest-
driven strategies. For Europe, the lesson of the new Chinese presence 
in Africa is simply: Get ready to recognize Africa as a partner and 
equal. Get ready to conceptualize strategies and projects of mutually 
reinforcing self-interest. It is here that the European (and especially 
German) tradition of “Ordnungspolitik” (order policy) may come in 
as a more sophisticated and sustainable development model than the 
Chinese rush for quick and rather one-dimensional results. 
•  It is remarkable that Africa has begun to discover one essential pre-
condition and consequence of the rise of China and the subsequent 
rise of India: to tap on the potential of the African diaspora. Most 
private investment in China was contributed by overseas Chinese. In 
the meantime, the more than twenty million overseas Indians have 
understood the mechanism and effect. They have discovered the in-
vestment potential in India. They realized that the reversion of brain 
drain must not be to their detriment. In fact, aside capital, they bring 
experience and inspiration. Africa is well-advised to enhance the role 
of the African diaspora and turn the issue of brain drain into a matter 
of brain circulation. This would include a structured policy of (possi-
 
11  See Denis M. Tull,  Die Afrikapolitik der Volksrepublik China, SWP-Studie, Ber-
lin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2005; Thomas Fues/Sven Grimm/Denise 
Leufer, „China’s Africa Policy: Opportunity and Challenge for European Develop-
ment Cooperation,” Briefing Paper 4, Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungs-
politik, 2006, online at: www.die-gdi.de/die-homepage.nsf; Barry V. Sautman, 
“Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa,” Working Paper 12, 
Hongkong: Center on China’s Transnational Relations 2005/2006, online at:   
www.cctr.ust.hk/articles/pdf/WorkingPaper12.pdf. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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bly temporary) migration to Europe and North America, but also a 
structured transfer of technical skills from Europe and North Amer-
ica to Africa. 
•  Most important, an updated development concept for Africa needs to 
include the wretched and poor of Africa as a source of opportunity. 
Poverty eradication is the goal, as stated in the United Nations Mil-
lenium Declaration and many fine statements by the African Union, 
regional groupings in Africa and many donor countries. But poverty 
eradication is no purpose in itself. It is aimed at empowering the in-
dividual in his or her human dignity through a better growth of his or 
her talent and potential. At the moment, all too often poverty is still 
considered a burden or an excuse in Africa. If Africa were to learn 
from the Chinese and, increasingly, the Indian experience Africa 
would define poverty and poor people as an opportunity. Poor people 
are an opportunity to invest in their better future and hence into a 
better future of the whole continent. The future of Africa cannot be 
based on different strategies as the future of any other modern soci-
ety: education, urbanization, possessive individualism and the broad-
ening of the market as an inclusive order of freedom. To make such a 
sociological development work, the political sector needs to provide 
the frame but cannot generate the content.  
•  In the course of Western modernization rule of law has preceded 
democracy, sometimes even modern statehood. It cannot be different 
in Africa. Reliable rule of law is the key to advance domestic stabil-
ity and regional integration. Accountable participation in the name of 
democracy will follow suit. Democracy cannot generate social inclu-
sion by itself. It requires a legal frame that protects the weak and 
predicts life for the strong. Without the primacy of rule of law good 
governance remains rhetoric. With reliable rule of law in strong 
states the primacy of regional law can become a logical continuation 
rather than a limit of individual state action. There is no cultural ob-
stacle or limit to the application of this insight. The application of 
this law of reliable and sustainable modernization may take time. 
There is no reason why eventually it cannot work with the same re-African Regional Integration and the Role of the 
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sult in Africa as it has done in Europe or North America. The main 
reason does not lie in anthropological, cultural and religious factors. 
The main reason lies in the structure of societal developments under 
the condition of the homogenizing yet incomplete and fragile modern 
state. Only rule of law is an objective and sustainable glue that holds 
a state together, makes it strong and ready to open for cooperation 
and eventual integration with neighbours and partners. Therefore, 
also regional integration needs to be law-based and empowered with 
a legislative component gradually shaping a community law. 
IV. 
The European Union is promoting regional integration in Africa and else-
where. During past years, its focus in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific 
was related to the negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements. Since 
2002, the EU enticed its ACP partners to engage in these negotiations. The 
EU claimed that the negotiations would strengthen regional integration in 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. By replacing preferential trade 
agreements (that have been in place through subsequent Yaoundé Conven-
tions, Lomé Agreements and the Cotonou Agreement of 2000) by free 
trade mechanisms, the EU would comply with WTO provisions. At the 
same time, the EU claimed, relations with Africa, the Caribbean and the 
Pacific regions would be put on the basis of equality and a true partnership. 
By 2008, interim agreements had been reached with several sub-regions 
and individual countries or contingent groupings of countries in Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific. More than anybody else, EU officials had be-
come doubtful of the multiply potential of Economic Partnership Agree-
ments. The EU was looking for a new rationale in its relations with the 
countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.
12  
 
12  For further details see Mir A. Ferdowsi (ed.), Vom Enthusiasmus zur Ernüchterung? 
Die Entwicklungspolitik der Europäischen Union, Munich: Forschungsstelle Dritte 
Welt, 1999;  “Strategy for Africa: An EU Regional Political Partnership for Peace, 
Security and Development in the Horn of Africa,” in: European Commission (ed.), Ludger Kühnhardt 
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The beginning of these relations dates back to the initial Treaties of Rome 
founding the European Economic Community in 1957. The Treaties of 
Rome granted a five-year trial period for the commercial and financial as-
sociation of French, Belgian and Dutch overseas territories. Article 131 and 
Article 136 created a de facto free trade area between the European Eco-
nomic Communities and its associated areas. The most visible immediate 
effect was the availability of new European outlets for African tropical 
fruits. More long term was the effect of the Development Fund established 
by the Treaties of Rome to improve the infrastructure in the southern he-
misphere. This was the beginning of a European development policy.
 In 
1963, the relationship between the European Economic Communities and 
eighteen associated states in Africa plus Madagascar was renewed through 
the Yaoundé Convention, named after the capital of Cameroon where the 
agreement was signed. It provided commercial advantages and financial aid 
to Africa. In force since July 1, 1964, its successor – the Yaoundé II Con-
vention – followed in 1969. The quest for a new beginning between the 
now European Community and many of its former colonies was increasing-
ly linked to the struggle for a new world economic order. In responding to 
the continuous demands from the Southern hemisphere, the European 
Community offered a comprehensive scheme of partnership and preferen-
tial cooperation for Europe’s most desperate former colonies.  
In 1975, the European Community and 46 countries of Africa, the Carib-
bean and the Pacific signed the Lomé Convention. Further Lomé Conven-
tions followed at an interval of five years. Lomé IV, signed in 1990, 
 
Compendium on Development Cooperation Strategies, Brussels: European Com-
mission, Directorate General for Development, October 2007: 7-23;  “European 
Union Strategy for Africa: Conclusions by the Heads of State and Government 
Meeting in the European Council, Brussels, December 15-16, 2005,” in: European 
Commission (ed.), Compendium on Development Cooperation Strategies, Brussels: 
European Commission, Directorate General for Development, October 2006: 61-
182; Sven Grimm/Nina Kielwein, „Die Afrikastrategie der Europäischen Union – 
Kohärenz gegenüber einem vielschichtigen Kontinent im Wandel,“ in: Analysen 
und Stellungnahmen, Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, 9(2005); 
Peter Molt, „Zur Afrikastrategie der Europäischen Union,“ Aus Politik und Zeitge-
schichte, 48(2007): 33-38; Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bouquet/Siegmar African Regional Integration and the Role of the 
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included 77 countries. Unlike the Lomé Conventions I to III, the last Lomé 
Agreement lasted for ten years and included a mid-term review. It covered 
638 million people in the Southern hemisphere. The Lomé Conventions 
entailed innovations and improvements in North-South-relations:  
 
•  On principle trade was conducted on a non-reciprocal basis. The EC 
partner states – called ACP states (ACP stands for Africa, Caribbean, 
Pacific) were exempted from the GATT multi-fiber agreement, 
which placed restrictions on textile exports from developing coun-
tries to industrial markets. When GATT was replaced by the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1993, this principle came under in-
creasing pressure by countries and regions not participating in this 
non-reciprocal trade privilege. 
•  In a spirit of partnership and cooperation, the European Community 
unilaterally exempted certain ACP- products from customs levies 
and import taxes. 
•  The most innovative component of the Lomé Convention was the 
stabilization mechanism for raw materials: A fund was created by the 
EC to provide for stabilizing capital for raw materials from the part-
ner countries if the price for their raw materials falls below a certain 
threshold or in case of an excessively bad harvest. This STABEX-
system constituted a resource transfer to the ACP budgets. 
On June 23, 2000, a new long-term approach in the relationship between 
the European Union and its ACP partners, including Africa, began: The 
Cotonou Agreement was signed between the EU and 15 Caribbean, 14 Pa-
cific and all 48 sub-Saharan countries. Africa provides 95 percent of the 
total ACP population and gets 80 percent of all support funds defined by 
the Cotonou Agreement. This agreement replaced the Lomé IV Convention 
and is intended to last for twenty years. Its main features are the following: 
 
Schmidt/Corina Schuhkraft/Ulrike Kessler/Philipp Gieg (eds.), Die Afrikapolitik 
der Europäischen Union: Neue Ansätze und Perspektiven, Opladen: Budrich, 2007.    Ludger Kühnhardt 
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•  The Cotonou Agreement emphasizes political dialogue with a streng-
thened inclusion of civil society. 
•  In terms of economic cooperation, it replaced preferential relations 
with the principle of reciprocity as requested by the WTO but poten-
tially to the disadvantage of several EU-partner countries in Africa; 
until 2008, new regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) 
with each of the ACP regions were to be negotiated.  
•  The ACP countries are no longer exempted from the WTO multi-
fiber agreements with their restrictions on textile exports from devel-
oping countries to industrialized markets. This is extremely relevant 
for some African countries: 58 percent of total exports from Lesotho 
and 39 percent of total exports from Mozambique are in textiles. 
•  Several preferential elements of the Lomé Convention favored agri-
cultural activities in countries producing beef (Botswana, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe), sugar (Tanzania, Mauritius, Malawi, Swaziland) and the 
economies of the land-locked African countries. They have been dis-
continued by the Cotonou Convention.
13 
The main reason for the fundamental shift from preferential trade arrange-
ments to the principle of reciprocity was the ruling of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement body according to which the provisions of the Lomé Conven-
tion were unfair by giving preference to banana exporters in the Caribbean 
and in other countries with special relations to Europe. The Cotonou 
Agreement stipulates the principle of reciprocity in free trade. To comply 
with its logic, the Cotonou Agreement divided the ACP countries into dif-
ferent regional groupings. The subsequent negotiation of Economic Part-
nership Agreements left it to the African countries to decide under which 
configuration they wished to negotiate with the EU. Since  2002, the EU 
 
13  For further details see Françoise Moreau, “The Cotonou Agreement – New Orienta-
tions”, in: The Courier 9(2000): 6-10; Siegmar Schmidt, “Aktuelle Aspekte der EU-
Entwicklungspolitik: Aufbruch zu neuen Ufern?” in: Aus Politik und Zeit-
geschichte, B 19-20(2000): 29-38; Olufemi Babarinde/Gerrit Faber, „From Lomé to 
Cotonou: Business as Usual?“, in: European Foreign Policy Review 9(2004): 27-47. African Regional Integration and the Role of the 
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negotiated Economic Partnership Agreements with the following groupings 
in Africa: 
1. West Africa: all ECOWAS member states plus Mauritania; 
2. Central Africa: all CEMAC member states plus São Tomé and Príncipe 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
3. Eastern and Southern Africa: all COMESA member states except Ango-
la, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Libya and Swaziland. 
4. SADC minus: all SACU member states including South Africa as an ob-
server, plus Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania. 
 
Chart I: African Regional Organizations 
 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa: Assessing Regional Integration in Africa Ad-
dis Abeba 2004, p. 84. 
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Table I: Memberships of African Regional Groupings Compared to Memberships of Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) Negotiating Groupings (2008) 
regional groupings 
 
COMESA SADC  ESA 
EPA 
SADC 
EPA 
ECOWAS UEMOA ECOWAS 
EPA 
CEMAC  CEMAC 
EPA 
Angola  x  x     x                
Botswana     x     x                
Burundi  x     x                   
Comores  x     x                   
Dem. Rep. of the Congo  x  x                   x 
Djibouti  x     x                   
Egypt  x                         
Eiritrea  x     x                   
Ethopia  x     x                   
Kenya  x     x                   
Lesotho  until 1997  x     x                
Libya  x                         
Madagascar  x  x  x                   
Malawi  x  x  x                   
Mauritius  x  x  x                   
Mozambique  until 1997  x     x                
Namibia  until 2004  x     x                
Rwanda  x     x                   
Seychelles  x  x  x                   
South Africa     x     x                
Sudan  x     x                   
Swaziland  x  x     x                
Tanzania  until 2000  x     x                
Uganda  x     x                   
Zambia  x  x  x                   
Zimbabwe  x  x  x                   
                             
Benin              x  x  x       
Burkina Faso              x  x  x       
Cape Verde              x     x       
Cote d'Ivoire              x  x  x       
Gambia              x     x       
Ghana              x     x       
Guinea              x     x       
Guinea-Bissau              x  x  x       
Liberia              x     x       
Mali              x  x  x       
Niger              x  x  x       
Nigeria              x     x       
Sao Tome and Principe                    x       
Senegal              x  x  x       
Sierra Leone              x     x       
Togo              x  x  x       
                             
Cameroon                       x  x 
Central African Republic                       x  x 
Chad                       x  x 
Equatorial Guinea                       x  x 
Gabon                       x  x 
Republic of Congo                       x  x 
Source: ZEI, Stefan Busse 
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By 2008, only some interim agreements with contingent groups of partners 
and individual member states were finalized. The EPA negotiations had 
turned out to be difficult, if not stuck in an impasse. The European Union 
and its African partners are now obliged to take stock and conceptualize a 
new beginning. Time has come to put European-African relations into a 
historical context, to study them in a comparative regional way and to re-
define them by a new and comprehensive political strategy. In the course of 
the past decade or so, the European Union had initiated bi-regional associa-
tion agreements with MERCOSUR, and eventually also with the Andean 
Community of Nations (CAN) and the System of Central American Inte-
gration (SICA). None of these negotiations has come to fruition by 2008. 
The negotiation with MERCOSUR had even been suspended for several 
years. But, the overall idea of bi-regional association agreements reflects a 
new strategic vision and orientation. The aim is to achieve a comprehensive 
political and economic scheme of association that contributes to stabilizing 
global developments, supports regional integration as it (really) stands in 
Latin America and projects the global role of the European Union. If it 
were successful, bi-regional association agreements would constitute a new 
global reality and an additional dimension of global governance. By-
regional association agreements could become a strong answer to the chal-
lenge of globalization and an element in managing the opportunities of 
globalization. Bi-regional association agreements could be the appropriate 
element of moving from a post-colonial relationship to a mature relation-
ship among equals in the age of globalization. 
As far as Europe’s relationship with the former colonies in Africa, the Car-
ibbean and the Pacific is concerned, such a relationship is yet to grow. In 
light of the ambivalent experiences with negotiating Economic Partnership 
Agreements, the EU should reconsider its strategy toward Africa, the Car-
ibbean and the Pacific. 
1.  The preferential trade relationship with Africa and subsequently also 
with the Caribbean and the Pacific region has accompanied European 
integration from its very beginning. Since the initial commitment of 
the Treaties of Rome in 1957, the European relationship with former Ludger Kühnhardt 
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or current colonies and overseas territories of some of the EEC (later 
EC and EU) member states was based initially on a late colonial and 
later on a post-colonial relationship. It moved from dependency to 
cooperation, from colonial dominance to guilt and development aid. 
It continued to cover special vested interests of some former Euro-
pean colonial powers in some of their former colonies (and continu-
ously existing overseas territories). The European Union as a whole 
has grown as this relationship has matured. Economic Partnership 
Agreement’s (EPA’s) were meant to be a modernizing continuation 
of this policy of five decades. However, they were too narrow, one-
dimensional in their economic orientation and almost anti-political. 
They never had the potential to be a comprehensive strategy for re-
designing Europe’s relationship with Africa, the Caribbean and the 
Pacific.  
2.  The negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements were inher-
ently contradictory as far as the main normative objective of the 
European Union is concerned: promoting regional integration in Af-
rica, the Caribbean and the Pacific. While the EU was claiming to 
promote regional integration, it did not recognize the existing re-
gional groupings as its integral and comprehensive negotiation part-
ner. Instead of negotiating in the Caribbean with CARICOM, the EU 
“invented” CARIFORUM to include Cuba and the Dominican Re-
public. Both these countries are not considered to be helpful engines 
of Caribbean regional integration by CARICOM to which they do 
not belong. Instead of negotiating with the Pacific Islands Forum 
(PIC), which has established itself in recent years as the nucleus of 
pan-Pacific regional integration, the EU preferred a different ap-
proach of negotiation vis-à-vis Australia and New Zealand on the 
one hand (both of which are PIF member states), the Melanesian 
group of PIF countries, Papua New Guinea in particular, on the other 
hand, while not pursuing a comprehensive negotiation strategy with 
the PIF as a whole. In Africa, the situation was likewise incoherent. 
The EU was negotiating with four idiosyncratic groupings and not 
comprehensively with any of the existing regional groupings. But in African Regional Integration and the Role of the 
European Union 
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order to support regional integration in Africa, the EU needs to rec-
ognize regional groupings as they exist, no matter their substance, no 
matter how complex and difficult the relationship therefore may be 
and no matter how comprehensive the EU approach ought to be to 
accommodate the interests and conditions of all the respective re-
gional partners. Everything else would always remain, at best, be a 
lukewarm support of region-building. 
3.  The European Union needs to develop a comprehensive political 
strategy for its future relationship with the regional groupings in Af-
rica, in the Caribbean and in the Pacific region. Together, they may 
well pursue the goal of reciprocal free trade as one tool but they 
should never elevate reciprocal free trade to be the ultimate and 
comprehensive goal of a bi-regional relationship. The regional 
groupings in Africa, in the Caribbean and in the Pacific have ma-
tured. They still may be weak, contradictory and insufficient. Yet, as 
they exist they are expressions of a genuine and independent expres-
sion of region-building. They have become political processes and 
ought to be supported as such. They have to be taken seriously by the 
European Union as a political and economic expression of the genu-
ine interest of the respective people, societies and states. The Euro-
pean Union can define criteria for the management of bi-regional 
relationships. These criteria ought to be defined by normative princi-
ples inherent in the European integration project, including the pro-
motion of human rights, rule of law, democracy, good governance 
and market economy. But only a political approach culminating in 
coherent, comprehensive and multi-dimensional bi-regional associa-
tion agreements with the existing regional groupings in Africa, in the 
Caribbean and in the Pacific region can serve as the basis of a new, 
mature and equal relationship between the European Union and large 
parts of a world that have outgrown post-colonialism. 
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Table II: State of Negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), (May 2008) 
Eastern and Southern Africa 
-  The LDCs Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Malawi, Sudan and Zambia export under the EBA initia-
tive since 1/1/2008. 
-  An ESA-EU framework agreement and an EAC-EU framework agreement have been signed as 
interim agreements. These are expected to lead to two full EPAs by the end of 2008 and by July 
2009 respectively. 
Southern Africa 
-  Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, Mozambique (23/11/2007) and Namibia (12/12/2007) 
signed interim agreements, while Angola is still negotiating. 
-  South Africa continues exporting to the EU under the TDCA. 
-  SADC-EPA states plan on applying a full EPA by the end of December 
Central Africa 
-  Cameroon and the EU have initiated an interim agreement on 17/12/2007. 
-   An interim agreement with Gabon may be concluded in 2008.  
-  The third non-LDC Republic of the Congo has shown little interest in the negotiations.  
-  The LDCs Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Gui-
nea and São Tomé and Principe export under the EBA initiative since 1/1/2008.  
West Africa 
-  The non-LDCs Ivory Coast and Ghana signed interim agreements with the EU. 
-  The remaining non-LDCs, Nigeria and Cape Verde, export under the standard GSP and under 
the EBA initiative since 1/1/2008. 
-  The LDCs Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo export under the EBA initiative since 1/1/2008. 
-  According to ECOWAS, the conclusion of a full EPA is not to be expected before mid of 2009. 
Pacific Region 
-  Papua New Guinea and Fiji have initiated an interim agreement with the EU on 23/11/2007. 
-   The non-LDCs Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Marshall Isl-
ands and Tonga export to the EU under the GSP regime since 1/1/2008. 
-  The LDCs East Timor, Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu export under the 
EBA initiative since 1/1/2008. 
-  A full regional EPA is expected to be concluded by the end of 2008. 
Caribbean Region 
-  Initiated a full EPA with the EU. The formal ministerial signature of the Caribbean-EU EPA is 
scheduled for June 2008. 
EBA:  “Everything But Arms” 
GSP:   “Generalized System of Preferences” 
LCD:   “Least Developed Country” 
TDCA:  Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement 
Source: ZEI, Stefan Busse African Regional Integration and the Role of the 
European Union 
 27
V. 
In order for the European Union to take African regional integration seri-
ously, Africa has to break what Nigeria’s former President Olusegun 
Obasanjo has called the “over-dependency-under-performance syn-
drome.”
14 In concrete terms, this requires a tangible re-calibration of devel-
opment strategies aimed at moving from aid-driven development to aid-
framed and –supported private initiative as key to sustainable development. 
As far as the daunting problem of overlapping membership in different and 
often idiosyncratic regional groupings is concerned, Africa has to move 
from efforts to understand the chaotic world of overlapping memberships 
in regional groupings to an analytical frame that is trying to make sense of 
region-building in Africa through the prism of concentric circles: Applying 
the concept of subsidiarity and implying the need for a clear ordering of 
competences, priorities and potentialities, Africa has to redesign its region-
building map along the notion of concentric circles:    
First circle: African states ought to be considered the prime basis for any 
integration scheme on the continent. They need to strengthen their ability to 
provide public goods, protect non-negotiable normative principles (espe-
cially human rights, rule of law, market economy and good governance) 
and contribute to the development of supranational levels of governance in 
Africa. Only strong and capable states can be good partners in integration 
and engines for region-building. 
Second circle: The regional groupings in Africa need to be considered the 
second layer in the construction of regional integration in Africa. They 
need to move ahead to become multi-dimensional structures of governance, 
vertically covering a broad array of public domains and horizontally re-
connecting with the states and societies that are constitutive parts of each 
regional grouping. Eventually African regional groupings will have to 
move from the economic agenda to the agenda of peace and governance. 
 
14  Cit. In Timothy Muriti (ed.), „Institutionalizing Pan-Africanism: Transforming Af-
rican Union Values and Principles into Policy and Practice“, IIS Paper 143, 
Thswane (Pretoria): Institute for Security Studies, 2007: 13. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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They will also need to create some form of supranational authority and a 
gradually growing common legislation, monitored and, if necessary, ad-
vanced by the work of an independent regional judiciary. 
Third circle: On the continental level, the African Union serves as facilita-
tor and engine for the advancement of regional groupings. The African Un-
ion coordinates regional activities and should intent to harmonize 
objectives, instruments and policy formulations. It may remain the em-
bodiment of the quest for African unity. This quest ought to be understood 
as an expression of a common identity and a shared political culture, sup-
ported by efforts of collective security and continent-wide implementation 
of standards of human rights and governance. But in the end, most proba-
bly the African Union will play more the role of a hybrid of Council of 
Europe, the OSCE and United Nations. Africa’s “European Union’s” will 
rest with some of the continents regional groupings. 
Fourth circle: Africa might consider an extension of the scope and radius of 
its continent-wide coordination organs by reaching out to a cooperative 
structure that includes the most important strategic partners of Africa. Such 
a cooperative association with the EU, the US, China, Russia and the Arab 
League could serve as an externalized collective development and security 
platform aimed at stabilizing the genuine African efforts in peace-building 
and post-conflict management, but also supporting those aspects of global 
governance in which African issues and global issues are inextricably 
linked.  
Africa has entered a new stage of region-building. The concept to achieve 
the African Economic Community by 2028 has been achieved at different 
levels in different regions of Africa. New components have been intro-
duced into the agenda of African regional integration with the need for 
post-conflict management, the importance to move from petrified pluralism 
to dynamic pluralism, from static to real rule of law and from formal to 
deep integration including a legislative component. The core issues at this 
moment in time are trust, based on symmetric regime structures, and im-
plementation based on clearly defined goals, criteria and time-tables. Only 
some of the many African regional groupings can be expected to achieve 
the necessary success on this path. For the time being, most likely African Regional Integration and the Role of the 
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ECOWAS, SADC and the EAC are the prime candidates for success. They 
are multi-dimensional, have gone through the experience of crisis and re-
newal, are political in nature, and promising in potential and seriousness of 
their leading actors.  
Other regional groupings will probably play supportive roles, either func-
tional or sector-specific, in the context of the overarching leadership of the 
strongest of the African regional groupings. The African Union will need to 
distinguish between strong and weak regional groupings according to the 
normative principles of trust and democracy, rule of law and good govern-
ance, potential and capacity to project multi-dimensional interests and 
agendas. At the core of deep integration stands the recognition of the pri-
macy of some sort of supranational political authority, usually backed by a 
supranational legal authority. Only with these mechanisms in place can 
economic authority grow. Like democratic accountability and supranational 
rule of law, economic credibility as a precondition for a genuine African 
Economic Community which is both sustained and successful. 
At this point in time, the question for Africa is not whether maximalist or 
gradualist concepts of region-building prevail. A smart approach would 
combines maximalist objectives with gradualist approaches and processes. 
Gradualist federalism can be a smart and successful way to combine ideal-
ism with realism, vision with rational management of daily affairs and con-
tingent obstacles. Such an approach will help to generate a unique and 
respected form of multi-level governance in Africa. 
15Concentric circles of 
 
15  See Admore Mupoki Kambudzi, „Portrayal of a Possible Path to a Single Govern-
ment for Africa“, in: Timothy Murithi (ed.), Towards a Union Government for Af-
rica: Challenges and Responses, Pretoria/Thswane: Institute for Security Studies, 
2008:13-27. Kambudzis paper is the most stimulating and thoughtful contribution 
of a remarkable book. The book echoes the 2007 debate among AU Heads of State 
and Government about the potential for a unified African government. While in the 
end, the majority of Africa’s political leaders opted for a gradual path toward conti-
nent-wide integration, their debate – and the subsequent echo to it in political circles 
and among academics in Africa – has advanced the quality and depth of the African 
discourse on regional integration considerably. Kambudzi, Secretary to the AU 
Peace and Security Council, must be lauded for advancing the debate and focussing 
it in a way that combines realism with idealism. His paper is a lasting milestone in 
the intellectual reflection about African region-building. It will serve as a landmark Ludger Kühnhardt 
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overlapping policy issues are a better perspective for Africa than the solar 
system-like and almost unrelated circles of formalistic memberships. A 
strategy of concentric circles for African region-building requires a clear 
ordering of political competencies between the different levels of govern-
ance.
16 Such a strategy could break the circle of pretension and rhetoric in-
tegration that is still strongly represented in African region-building. 
VI.   
The major question for African region-building is of a strategic nature: 
How to achieve result-oriented deep integration? How to do things better, 
more effective and with sustainable effects? How to define the potential of 
integration from its opportunities instead of being scared or worried about 
its limits? On paper, the declaratory frame around the actors of African re-
gion-building is impressive. The new momentum for regional integration in 
Africa is a fine opportunity that should not be missed. But it needs strategic 
focus, honest re-assessment of priorities and links between the existing 
structures and – most importantly – an optimal use of limited resources in 
order to achieve visible and lasting early results. 
African states, African regional groupings and the African Union need to 
conceptualize their common future toward a functioning multi-level gov-
ernance system in Africa on the basis of three components: 
•  A clear strategy linked to manageable priorities.  
•  A clear time frame linked to realistic procedures of work. 
•  A clear definition of binding criteria.   
 
for the future debate on region-building in Africa. On the Grand Debate among the 
AU leaders see Delphine Lecouture, “Reflections on the 2007 Grand Debate on a 
Union Government for Africa”, in: Timothy Murithi (ed.), Towards a Union Gov-
ernment for Africa, op.cit.: 45-59.   
16  For an initial proposal of how to order competencies in an African multi-level gov-
ernance system see Irungu Houghton, “Identifying the Domains of Competence and 
the Possible Impact of the Establishment of a Union Government on the Sover-
eignty of States,” in: Timothy Murithi (ed.), Towards a Union Government for Af-
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The third aspect is probably the most important one to advance African re-
gional integration. Strategies, priorities, even time-tables and verbal com-
mitments are cheap currency and in fact they are a rhetoric currency widely 
available in Africa (as elsewhere). But the need to define clear and binding 
criteria for the implementation of visions, programs and projects is key to 
move from rhetoric to real integration. There is enormous need for defining 
criteria and binding mechanisms in African region-building. African lead-
ers and European partners of Africa should consider it a prime obligation to 
work on binding criteria for the implementation of noble goals and reason-
able objectives. Aiming for the African Economic Community, establishing 
African peacekeeping brigades, continuing the interesting African Peer Re-
view Mechanism on compliance with principles of good governance, mak-
ing the institutions more effective, strengthening the role of the African 
Parliament and moving toward direct election of regional parliaments, ad-
vancing the role of regional and continental judiciary in matters of human 
rights but eventually in all matters of constitutional relevance with a recog-
nition of the primacy of supranational judiciary – these are impressive, fine 
and welcome objectives. These objectives reflect a new reality in Africa, a 
new sense of commitment, ownership and responsibility. A lot of credit 
must go to those leaders and experts, civil servants and consultants who 
have re-engineered the quest for African unity into the direction of func-
tional and working regional integration. But now it is time to deliver. And 
deliverance requires criteria and a certain degree of conditionality. 
In order to move ahead, African actors in regional integration need to iden-
tify obstacles to integration if they want to better understand why certain 
things may not work, take longer to be implemented or require different 
techniques in order to succeed. They also need to identify possible federa-
tors and those mechanisms and actors that can bring the cause of integra-
tion forward. Africa needs more stakeholders that appreciate the potential 
of regional integration of streamlined competencies among the horizontal 
and vertical actors involved in integration or affected by its consequences.  
Africa’s regional integration efforts will have to move ahead in the direc-
tion of common legislative commitments with clear implementation proce-Ludger Kühnhardt 
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dures. It must be avoided that such a trend would be perceived as a zero-
sum-game between African states and African regional groupings. A win-
win-perception can be achieved only if regional integration can generate 
authentic value added for all participating actors and constituent parts. 
Therefore, the guiding question accompanying any integration project must 
be: What can a regional grouping – or Africa as a whole – do better than 
any of its member states? To think from the potential of regional integra-
tion is the only pro-active strategy to avoid being trapped by considerations 
about the limits, problems, obstacles and backlashes of integration. 
As this tends to be an abstract thought, it is essential for the African Union 
and for the regional groupings across Africa to define spheres of potential 
value added through regional integration with binding character. It would 
be misleading to assume that this can only be a “good weather operation”. 
In fact, the overall European experience with integration suggests other-
wise: European integration projects were mostly achieved because of a 
combination of three different and potentially contradicting factors: 
•  The insight of the limits of national actor capacity and the inner 
strength to recognize that regional solutions will be better. 
•  The recognition that a joint will requires compromises which are not 
always based on a speedy “return on investment” but need to be un-
derstood as a long term commitment of all partners. 
•  The understanding that different interests can be coupled through 
mutual trust in the overall usefulness of a project in spite of existing 
differences in motivation and objectives.   
The experience of the Franco-German tandem as engine of European inte-
gration provides ample examples for this theory. When integration began in 
Europe, France wanted to project its political strength onto the European 
level while (West) Germany was looking for moral rehabilitation after the 
disastrous destruction triggered by the German totalitarian regime under 
Hitler. Eventually, the six founding states of the European Economic 
Community came together in 1957 defining functional and sector-specific 
economic integration as their first joint strategic goal on a long political 
path.  When the common European currency was initiated, France wanted African Regional Integration and the Role of the 
European Union 
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speedy access to the then strong German mark while (united) Germany was 
interested in Europeanizing its monetary policy, including the establish-
ment of a politically independent Central Bank. Eventually, all EU partners 
agreed with the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 which combined a firm schedule 
toward full monetary union with concrete and enforceable criteria to make 
the monetary union an economic success beyond the interventionist ambi-
tions of changing political majorities.  When the French President launched 
the idea of a Mediterranean Union, he wanted the other EU partners, Ger-
many in particular, to share his vision while Germany - and other non-
Mediterranean European governments - was initially highly sceptical. 
Eventually, they did not want to be left out and leave the idea to become a 
unilateral French-project: in March 2008, all EU member states and institu-
tions agreed to form a Union for the Mediterranean.  
These are but three examples from different decades underlining the need 
to identify diverging interests in order to pool their potential for the com-
mon good. African regional integration strategists would be well advised to 
study this European experience carefully in order to move from idealism to 
realism in the pursuit of their own region-building agenda: Existing com-
monalities do not necessarily trigger joint projects. Although this can hap-
pen, it is not certain. Political will and sustained regional, supranational 
structures remain essential.    
Africa has ample room to identify win-win-constellations originating in 
deep and real region-building. Infrastructure measures and basic need pro-
visions, optimizing human resources and migration potential, generating 
employment and sustainable growth, prioritizing education and closing the 
digital divide, preserving the human habitat and providing work conditions 
in line with human dignity – these are but a few of the basic challenges that 
should be reconsidered as opportunities for Africa. The wisdom of African 
leaders will find the right answers and turn strategy into reality. Important 
is one of the European experiences: Africa needs working, efficient and 
uncompromising institutions, but it should not fall into the trap to take in-
stitution-building for region-building. Regional integration is a matter of 
real issues and concrete results in joint projects. Regional integration is not Ludger Kühnhardt 
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done by emulating any sort of institutions that one might conceive. Re-
gional integration happens through institutions and policies that work.  
VII.    
Currently, African region-building efforts are going through a formative 
period comparable to the period Europe went through between the mid-
1940s and the mid-1950s. After World War II, the need for a new begin-
ning was inevitable in Europe. State-relations and relations among Euro-
pean societies had to be based on a new rationale. They had to be framed 
by an organizing idea that would ensure peace and stability, affluence and 
freedom for generations to come. Europe’s Western democracies opted for 
functional economic integration as a tool to advance peace and to promote 
eventual political union. There is no law of nature that requires to begin 
with the same tool and to follow the same or a similar path. One fundamen-
tal lesson may be learned from the European integration experience: The 
formative idea that can carry the rationale for regional integration for dec-
ades must be of a political and strategic nature, encompassing many aspects 
of public life and influencing several social and political dimensions. The 
rationale for European integration was the idea of reconciliation based on a 
gradually emerging common rule of law. The rationale for African integra-
tion could be the formative idea of continental stability through socio-
economic progress based on a gradually emerging regionalized common 
rule of law. The limits of past state-centered policies need to be trans-
formed by the opportunities of integration-oriented policies. African re-
gional integration is going through its own formative years. They must be 
result- driven and open to the world in order to link Africa with the age of 
globalization. A remarkable new beginning has emerged in African region-
building. Now, the phase of deliverance has started. This is a new, some-
times daunting and often difficult chapter. But it is a chapter with a per-
spective: To re-define the place of African people, societies and states in 
dignity and respect amidst all the other players in the age of globalization. 
For Europe, this opens the responsibility to engage in a new and future-
oriented partnership with its neighbouring continent that truly deserves the 
name and will stand the test of time. ZEI DISCUSSION PAPER:   Bisher erschienen / Already published: 
C  1 (1998)  Frank Ronge (Hrsg.) 
Die baltischen Staaten auf dem Weg in die Europäische Union 
C  2 (1998)  Gabor Erdödy 
Die Problematik der europäischen Orientierung Ungarns 
C  3 (1998)  Stephan Kux 
Zwischen Isolation und autonomer Anpassung: Die Schweiz im 
integrationspolitischen Abseits? 
C  4 (1998)  Guido Lenzi 
The WEU between NATO and EU 
C  5 (1998)  Andreas Beierwaltes 
Sprachenvielfalt in der EU – Grenze einer Demokratisierung Europas?  
C  6 (1998)  Jerzy Buzek 
Poland’s Future in a United Europe 
C  7 (1998)  Doug Henderson 
The British Presidency of the EU and British European Policy 
C  8 (1998)  Simon Upton 
Europe and Globalisation on the Threshold of the 21st Century.  
A New Zealand Perspective 
C  9 (1998)  Thanos Veremis 
Greece, the Balkans and the European Union 
C 10 (1998)  Zoran Djindjic 
Serbiens Zukunft in Europa 
C 11 (1998)  Marcus Höreth 
The Trilemma of Legitimacy. Multilevel Governance in the EU and  
the Problem of Democracy 
C 12 (1998)  Saadollah Ghaussy 
Japan and the European Union 
C 13 (1998)  Walter Schweidler 
Bioethische Konflikte und ihre politische Regelung in Europa 
C 14 (1998)  Wolfgang Ischinger 
Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach Amsterdam 
C 15 (1998)  Kant K. Bhargava 
EU – SAARC: Comparisons and Prospects of Cooperation 
C 16 (1998)  Anthony J. Nicholls 
Die deutsch-britischen Beziehungen: Ein hoffnungsloser Fall? 
C 17 (1998)  Nikolaj Petersen 
The Danish Referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam 
C 18 (1998)  Aschot L. Manutscharjan 
Der Konflikt um Berg-Karabach: Grundproblematik und Lösungsperspektiven 
C 19 (1998)  Stefan Fröhlich 
Der Ausbau der europäischen Verteidigungsidentität zwischen WEU und NATO 
C 20 (1998)  Tönis Lukas 
Estland auf dem Weg aus der totalitären Vergangenheit zurück nach Europa 
C 21 (1998)  Wim F. van Eekelen 
Perspektiven der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU 
C 22 (1998)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Europa in den Kräftefeldern des 21. Jahrhunderts.  
C 23 (1998)  Marco Bifulco 
In Search of an Identity for Europe 
C 24 (1998)  Zbigniew Czachór 
Ist Polen reif für die Europäische Union? 
C 25 (1998)  Avi Primor 
Der Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten und die Rolle der Europäischen Union 
C 26 (1998)  Igor Leshoukov 
Beyond Satisfaction: Russia’s Perspectives on European Integration 
C 27 (1998)  Dirk Rochtus 
Die belgische „Nationalitätenfrage“ als Herausforderung für Europa  
C 28 (1998)  Jürgen Rüttgers 
Europa – Erbe und Auftrag 
C 29 (1999)  Murat T. Laumulin 
Die EU als Modell für die zentralasiatische Integration? 
C 30 (1999)  Valdas Adamkus 
Europe as Unfinished Business: The Role of Lithuania  
in the 21
st Century‘s Continent 
C 31 (1999)  Ivo Samson 
Der widerspruchsvolle Weg der Slowakei in die EU.  
C 32 (1999)  Rudolf Hrbek / Jean-Paul Picaper / Arto Mansala 
Deutschland und Europa. Positionen, Perzeptionen, Perspektiven 
C 33 (1999)  Dietrich von Kyaw 
Prioritäten der deutschen EU-Präsidentschaft unter Berücksichtigung des  
Europäischen Rates in Wien 
C 34 (1999)  Hagen Schulze 
Die Identität Europas und die Wiederkehr der Antike 
C 35 (1999)  Günter Verheugen 
Germany and the EU Council Presidency 
C 36 (1999)  Friedbert Pflüger 
Europas globale Verantwortung – Die Selbstbehauptung der alten Welt 
C 37 (1999)  José María Gil-Robles 
Der Vertrag von Amsterdam: Herausforderung für die Europäische Union 
C 38 (1999)  Peter Wittschorek 
Präsidentenwahlen in Kasachstan 1999 
C 39 (1999)  Anatolij Ponomarenko 
Die europäische Orientierung der Ukraine 
C 40 (1999)  Eduard Kukan 
The Slovak Republic on its Way into the European Union 
C 41 (1999)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Europa auf der Suche nach einer neuen geistigen Gestalt 
C 42 (1999)  Simon Green 
Ausländer, Einbürgerung und Integration: Zukunftsperspektive der  
europäischen Unionsbürgerschaft? 
C 43 (1999)  Ljerka Mintas Hodak 
Activities of the Government of the Republic of Croatia in the Process of  
European Integration 
C 44 (1999)  Wolfgang Schäuble 
Unsere Verantwortung für Europa 
C 45 (1999)  Eric Richard Staal 
European Monetary Union: The German Political-Economic Trilemma 
C 46 (1999)  Marek J. Siemek 
Demokratie und Philosophie 
C 47 (1999)  Ioannis Kasoulides 
Cyprus and its Accession to the European Union 
C 48 (1999)  Wolfgang Clement 
Perspektiven nordrhein-westfälischer Europapolitik 
C 49 (1999)  Volker Steinkamp 
Die Europa-Debatte deutscher und französischer Intellektueller nach dem  
Ersten Weltkrieg 
C 50 (1999)  Daniel Tarschys 
50 Jahre Europarat 
C 51 (1999)  Marcin Zaborowski 
Poland, Germany and EU Enlargement 
C 52 (1999)  Romain Kirt 
Kleinstaat und Nationalstaat im Zeitalter der Globalisierung 
C 53 (1999)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Die Zukunft des europäischen Einigungsgedankens  
C 54 (1999)  Lothar Rühl 
Conditions and options for an autonomous „Common European Policy on Security 
and Defence“ in and by the European Union in the post-Amsterdam perspective 
opened at Cologne in June 1999 
C 55 (1999)  Marcus Wenig (Hrsg.) 
Möglichkeiten einer engeren Zusammenarbeit in Europa am Beispiel  
Deutschland - Slowakei 
C 56 (1999)  Rafael Biermann 
The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe - potential, problems and  
perspectives 
C 57 (1999)  Eva Slivková 
Slovakia’s Response on the Regular Report from the European Commission  
on Progress towards Accession 
C 58 (1999)  Marcus Wenig (Ed.) 
A Pledge for an Early Opening of EU-Accession Negotiations 
C 59 (1999)  Ivo Sanader 
Croatia´s Course of Action to Achieve EU Membership 
C 60 (2000)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Europas Identität und die Kraft des Christentums 
C 61 (2000)  Kai Hafez 
The West and Islam in the Mass Media 
C 62 (2000)  Sylvie Goulard 
Französische Europapolitik und öffentliche Debatte in Frankreich 
C 63 (2000)  Elizabeth Meehan 
Citizenship and the European Union 
C 64 (2000)  Günter Joetze 
The European Security Landscape after Kosovo 
C 65 (2000)  Lutz Rathenow 
Vom DDR-Bürger zum EU-Bürger 
C 66 (2000)  Panos Kazakos 
Stabilisierung ohne Reform 
C 67 (2000)  Marten van Heuven 
Where will NATO be ten years from now ? 
C 68 (2000)  Carlo Masala 
Die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft 
C 69 (2000)  Weltachsen 2000/World Axes 2000. A documentation 
C 70 (2000)  Gert Maichel 
Mittel-/Osteuropa: Warum engagieren sich deutsche Unternehmen? 
C 71 (2000)  Marcus Wenig (Hrsg.) 
Die Bürgergesellschaft als ein Motor der europäischen Integration 
C 72 (2000)  Ludger Kühnhardt/Henri Ménudier/Janusz Reiter 
Das Weimarer Dreieck 
C 73 (2000)  Ramiro Xavier Vera-Fluixa 
Regionalbildungsansätze in Lateinamerika und ihr Vergleich mit der Europäischen 
Union 
C 74 (2000)  Xuewu Gu (Hrsg.) 
Europa und Asien: Chancen für einen interkulturellen Dialog? 
C 75 (2000)  Stephen C. Calleya 
Is the Barcelona Process working? 
C 76 (2000)  Àkos Kengyel 
The EU´s Regional Policy and its extension to the new members  
C 77 (2000)  Gudmundur H. Frìmannsson 
Civic Education in Europe: Some General Principles 
C 78 (2000)  Marcus Höreth 
Stille Revolution im Namen des Rechts? 
C 79 (2000)  Franz-Joseph Meiers 
Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsidentität (ESVI) oder Gemeinsame 
Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (GESVP)? C 80 (2000)  Gennady Fedorov 
Kaliningrad Alternatives Today 
C 81 (2001)  Ann Mettler 
From Junior Partner to Global Player: The New Transatlantic Agenda and Joint 
Action Plan 
C 82 (2001)  Emil Minchev 
Southeastern Europe at the beginning of the 21
st century 
C 83 (2001)  Lothar Rühl 
Structures, possibilities and limits of European crisis reaction forces for conflict 
prevention and resolution 
C 84 (2001)  Viviane Reding 
Die Rolle der EG bei der Entwicklung Europas von der Industriegesellschaft zur 
Wissens- und Informationsgesellschaft 
C 85 (2001)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Towards Europe 2007. Identity, Institution–Building and the Constitution of Europe
C 86 (2001)  Janusz Bugajski 
Facing the Future: The Balkans to the Year 2010 
C 87 (2001)  Frank Ronge / Susannah Simon (eds.) 
Multiculturalism and Ethnic Minorities in Europe 
C 88 (2001)  Ralf Elm 
Notwendigkeit, Aufgaben und Ansätze einer interkulturellen Philosophie 
C 89 (2001)  Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg 
The Big Leap to the West: The Impact of EU on the Finnish Political System 
C 90 (2001)  Valérie Guérin-Sendelbach (Hrsg.) 
Interkulturelle Kommunikation in der deutsch-französischen  
Wirtschaftskooperation 
C 91 (2001)  Jörg Monar  
EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement: The Challenge of 
Diversity and EU Instruments and Strategies 
C 92 (2001)  Michael Gehler 
Finis Neutralität? Historische und politische Aspekte im europäischen Vergleich: 
Irland, Finnland, Schweden, Schweiz und Österreich 
C 93 (2001)  Georg Michels 
Europa im Kopf – Von Bildern, Klischees und Konflikten 
C 94 (2001)  Marcus Höreth 
The European Commission’s White Paper Governance: A ‘Tool-Kit’ for closing the 
legitimacy gap of EU policymaking? 
C 95 (2001)  Jürgen Rüland 
ASEAN and the European Union: A Bumpy Interregional Relationship 
C 96 (2001)  Bo Bjurulf 
How did Sweden Manage the European Union? 
C 97 (2001)  Biomedizin und Menschenwürde. 
Stellungnahmen von Ulrich Eibach, Santiago Ewig, Sabina Laetitia Kowalewski, 
Volker Herzog, Gerhard Höver, Thomas Sören Hoffmann und Ludger Kühnhardt 
C 98 (2002)  Lutz Käppel 
Das Modernitätspotential der alten Sprachen und ihre Bedeutung für die Identität 
Europas 
C 99 (2002)  Vaira Vike-Freiberga 
Republik Lettland und das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen – Partner in einem vereinten 
Europa 
C 100 (2002)  Janusz Musial 
Periodische Arbeitsmigration aus Polen (Raum Oppeln) nach Deutschland. Ein 
Testfall für die Erwerbswanderungen nach der Osterweiterung? 
C 101 (2002)  Felix Maier (Hrsg.) 
Managing asymmetric interdependencies within the Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship. 
C 102 (2002)  Hendrik Vos 
The Belgian Presidency and the post-Nice process after Laeken 
C 103 (2002)  Helmut Kohl 
Der EURO und die Zukunft Europas C 104 (2002)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
The Lakes of Europe 
C 105 (2002)  Katharina von Schnurbein 
Der tschechische EU-Beitritt: Politischer Prozeß wider die öffentliche Meinung 
C 106 (2002)  Andrew Dennison 
Shades of Multilateralism. U.S. Perspectives on Europe’s Role in the War on Ter-
rorism 
C 107 (2002)  Boris Hajoš et.al. 
The Future of the European Integration Process: Ideas and Concepts of Candidate 
Countries 
C 108 (2002)  Hans von der Groeben 
Europäische Integration aus historischer Erfahrung. Ein Zeitzeugengespräch mit 
Michael Gehler 
C 109 (2002)  Emil Mintchev /Klaus Bünger 
A Sustained Economic Revival in Kosovo. Need for a Liberal Concept 
C 110 (2002)  Michael Lochmann 
Die Türkei im Spannungsfeld zwischen Schwarzmeer-Kooperation und Europäi-
scher Union 
C 111 (2002)  Indra de Soysa / Peter Zervakis (eds.) 
Does Culture Matter? The Relevance of Culture in Politics and Governance in the 
Euro-Mediterranean Zone 
C 112 (2002)  José Manuel Martínez Sierra 
The Spanish Presidency. Buying more than it can choose? 
C 113 (2002)  Winfried Loth 
Europäische Identität in historischer Perspektive 
C 114 (2002)  Hansjörg Eiff 
Serbien – zwei Jahre nach Milosevics Sturz 
C 115 (2002)  Peter Doyle 
Ireland and the Nice Treaty 
C 116 (2002)  Stefan Fröhlich 
Das Projekt der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik 
(GESVP): Entwicklungen und Perspektiven 
C 117 (2003)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Welche Grenzen setzt die Globalisierung der europäischen Integration? 
C 118 (2003)  Franz-Josef Meiers (Hrsg.) 
Die Auswirkungen des 11. September 2001 auf die transatlantischen Beziehungen
C 119 (2003)  Hubert Iral 
Between Forces of Inertia and Progress: Co-decision in EU-Legislation 
C 120 (2003)  Carlo Masala (ed.) 
September 11 and the Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation 
C 121 (2003)  Marcus Höreth 
When Dreams Come True: The Role Of Powerful Regions In Future Europe 
C 122 (2003)  Glen Camp 
The End of the Cold War and US-EU-Relations 
C 123 (2003)  Finn Laursen / Berenice L. Laursen 
The Danish Presidency 2002: Completing the Circle from Copenhagen to  
Copenhagen 
C 124 (2003)  ZEI (Hrsg.) 
Der Verfassungsentwurf des EU-Konvents. Bewertung der Strukturentscheidungen
C 125 (2003)  Hans-Christian Maner 
Multiple Identitäten – Der Blick des orthodoxen Südosteuropa auf „Europa“ 
C 126 (2003)  Janko Prunk 
Die rationalistische Zivilisation 
C 127 (2003)  Władysław Bartoszewski 
Europas Identität nach der Osterweiterung 
C 128 (2003) 
 
 
 
Dimitris K. Xenakis and Dimitris N. Chryssochoou 
The 2003 Hellenic Presidency of the European Union. 
Mediterranean Perspectives on the ESDP C 129 (2004)  Fritz Hellwig 
Europäische Integration aus historischer Erfahrung. Ein Zeitzeugengespräch mit 
Michael Gehler 
C 130 (2004)  Thorsten Faas / Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg 
The Difference Between Real And Potential Power: Voting Power, Attendance and 
Cohesion 
C 131 (2004)  Andreas Jacobs (ed.) 
Euro-Mediterranean cooperation: enlarging and widening the perspective 
C 132 (2004)  Ludger Kühnhardt / Gabor Erdödy / Christoph Böhr 
L’Europa centrale fra le culture politiche nazionali tradizionali ed una nuova 
identità europea 
C 133 (2004)  Hubert Iral 
Wartesaal oder Intensivstation? Zur Lage der EU nach der gescheiterten Regie-
rungskonferenz  
C 134 (2004)  Nicole Groß 
Netzwerkbildung in der EU als regionale Standortpolitik? Nordrhein-Westfalen und 
die transnationalen Beziehungen zu Regionen im Benelux-Raum sowie in Mittel- 
und Osteuropa 
C 135 (2004) 
 
Karl-Heinz Narjes 
Europäische Integration aus historischer Erfahrung. Ein Zeitzeugengespräch mit 
Michael Gehler 
C 136 (2004) 
 
Ludger Kühnhardt 
The Global Proliferation of Regional Integration. European Experience and World-
wide Trends 
C 137 (2004)  Andreas Marchetti (ed.) 
The CSCE as a Model to Transform Western Relations with the Greater Middle 
East 
C 138 (2004)  Lothar Rühl 
Conditions for a European intervention strategy in application of the ESDP and 
US/Nato crisis management 
C 139 (2004)  Hubert Iral 
Im Spannungsfeld zwischen Normalzustand und Legitimationsfragen. Die Wahlen 
zum Europäischen Parlament 2004 vor dem Hintergrund der EU-Erweiterung und 
des Verfassungsgebungsprozesses 
C 140 (2004)  Franz-Josef Meiers 
Transatlantic Relations after the U.S. Elections. From Rift to Harmony? 
C 141 (2004)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
From National Identity to European Constitutionalism. European Integration: The 
first fifty years 
C 142 (2005)  Ashkaan Rahimi 
The Evolution of EU Asylum Policy 
C 143 (2005)  Samuel Wells / Ludger Kühnhardt (eds.) 
The Crisis in Transatlantic Relations 
C 144 (2005)  Hansjörg Eiff 
Zum Problem des Kosovo-Status 
C 145 (2005)  Miguel E. Cárdenas / Christian Arnold 
La experiencia de la Unión Europea y sus anécdotas para la «Comunidad Andina 
de Naciones» (CAN) 
C 146 (2005)  Franjo Štiblar 
Preservation of National Identity and Interests in the Enlarged EU 
C 147 (2005)  Erol Esen 
Grundzüge der Kommunalverwaltung und die europäische Integration der Türkei. 
Strukturen, Aufgaben und Standpunkte 
C 148 (2005)  Jürgen Elvert 
Zur gegenwärtigen Verfassung der Europäischen Union. Einige Überlegungen aus 
geschichtswissenschaftlicher Sicht 
C 149 (2005)  Matti Wiberg 
New Winners and Old Losers. A Priori Voting Power in the EU25 
 C 150 (2005)  Siebo M. H. Janssen 
Belgien – Modell für eine föderal verfasste EU? Die Föderalisierung Belgiens im 
Kontext der Europäischen Integration 
C 151 (2005)  Geert-Hinrich Ahrens 
Die Präsidentschaftswahlen in der Ukraine. Die schwierige Mission der OSZE/ 
ODIHR-Wahlbeobachter (August 2004 bis Januar 2005) 
C 152 (2005)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Northeast Asia: Obstacles to Regional Integration. The Interests of the European 
Union 
C 153 (2005)  Martin Zimmek 
Integrationsprozesse in Lateinamerika. Aktuelle Herausforderungen in Mittelameri-
ka und der Andenregion 
C 154 (2005)  Andreas Marchetti (ed.) 
Ten Years Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Defining European Interests for the 
Next Decade 
C 155 (2006)  Valeria Marziali 
Lobbying in Brussels. Interest Representation and Need for Information 
C 156 (2006)  Nina Eschke / Thomas Malick (eds.) 
The European Constitution and its Ratification Crisis. Constitutional Debates in the 
EU Member States 
C 157 (2006)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
European Integration: Challenge and Response. Crises as Engines of Progress in 
European Integration History 
C 158 (2006)  Andreas Marchetti 
The European Neighbourhood Policy. Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery 
C 159 (2006)  Thomas Demmelhuber 
The Euro-Mediterranean Space as an Imagined (Geo-)political, Economic and 
Cultural Entity 
C 160 (2006)  Emil Mintchev / Janusz Musial 
Stabilität durch Bildung. Die Fortbildungsprojekte des “Zentrum für Europäische 
Integrationsforschung” (ZEI) in Südosteuropa (1999 – 2006) 
C 161 (2006)  Jürgen Mittag 
Escaping the Legitimacy-Accountability-Trap? Perspectives of Parliamentary Par-
ticipation in European Security and Defence Policy 
C 162 (2006)  Cordula Janowski 
Globalization, Regional Integration and the EU. Pleadings for a Broader Perspec-
tive 
C 163 (2006)  Swetlana W. Pogorelskaja 
Die Bedeutung der deutschen parteinahen Stiftungen für die EU-Politik gegenüber 
den MOE- und GUS-Staaten 
C 164 (2006)  Wolfram Hilz 
Deutschlands EU-Präsidentschaft 2007. Integrationspolitische Akzente in schwie-
rigen Zeiten 
C 165 (2006)  Franz-Josef Meiers 
Zwischen Partnerschaft und Widerspruch. Die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehun-
gen seit dem 11. September 2001 
C 166 (2006)  Christiana Tings 
The new German European Policy. Challenges to Decentralised EU Policy Coordi-
nation 
C 167 (2007)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Europa neu begründen 
C 168 (2007)  Marvin Andrew Cuschieri 
Europe’s Migration Policy Towards the Mediterranean. The Need of Reconstruc-
tion of Policy-Making 
C 169 (2007)  Ariane Kösler 
The Southern African Development Community and its Relations to the European 
Union. Deepening Integration in Southern Africa? 
C 170 (2007)  Thomas Demmelhuber 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and its Implementation in the South-
ern Mediterranean. The Case of Egypt C 171 (2007)  Matthieu Bertrand / Ðorđe Popović / Denis Prešova (eds.) 
Reconstructing Europe. Two Alternative Proposals for a European Constitution 
C 172 (2007)  Frauke Muth 
When Sleeping Dogs Wake Up. Norway and Justice and Home Affairs in the   
European Union 
C 173 (2007)  Carsten Schymik 
Norwegens Sonderweg nach Europa. Warum Norwegen nicht Mitglied der Europä-
ischen Union ist 
C 174 (2007)  Mladen Dragasevic 
The Newest Old State in Europe. Montenegro Regaining Independence 
C 175 (2007)  Andreas Marchetti / Martin Zimmek (Hrsg.) 
Annäherungen an Europa. Beiträge zur deutschen EU-Ratspräsidentschaft 2007 
C 176 (2007)  Ariane Kösler / Martin Zimmek (eds.) 
Global Voices on Regional Integration 
C 177 (2007)  Dominic Heinz 
A Review of EU-Russian Relations. Added Value or Structurally Deficient? 
C 178 (2007)  Peter Hughes 
NATO and the EU: Managing the Frozen Conflict. Test Case Afghanistan 
C 179 (2008)  Martin Seidel 
Optionen für die Europäische Integration  
C 180 (2008)  Jeffrey Herf 
“The Jewish Enemy” Rethinking Anti-Semitism in the Era of Nazism and in Recent 
Times 
C 181 (2008)  Marcus Höreth / Jared Sonnicksen 
Making and Breaking Promises. The European Union under the Treaty of Lisbon 
C 182 (2008)  Anna Niemann / Sonja Ana Luise Schröder / Meredith Catherine Tunick (eds.) 
Recovering from the Constitutional Failure. An Analysis of the EU Reflection Pe-
riod 
C 183 (2008)  Yannis Tsantoulis 
Subregionalism in the Black Sea and the EU’s Role. Incentives, Obstacles and a 
‘New Synergy’ 
C 184 (2008)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
African Regional Integration and the Role of the European Union 
 
 
Das Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI) wurde 1995 als selbständig arbei-
tende, interdisziplinäre Forschungseinrichtung an der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 
Bonn gegründet. In Forschung, Lehre und Politikberatung sowie im Dialog zwischen Wissen-
schaft und Praxis beteiligt sich das ZEI an der Lösung bisher unbewältigter Probleme der europä-
ischen Einigung und der Gestaltung der Rolle Europas in der Welt. Weitere Informationen finden 
Sie auf unserer Homepage im Internet: http://www.zei.de. 
ZEI – DISCUSSION PAPERS richten sich mit ihren von Wissenschaftlern und politischen Akteuren 
verfaßten Beiträgen an Wissenschaft, Politik und Publizistik. Jeder Beitrag unterliegt einem inter-
nen Auswahlverfahren und einer externen Begutachtung. Gleichwohl gibt er die persönliche Mei-
nung der Autoren wieder. Die Beiträge fassen häufig Ergebnisse aus laufenden Forschungspro-
jekten zusammen. Die aktuelle Liste finden Sie auf unserer Homepage: http://www.zei.de. 
The Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) was established in 1995 as an indepen-
dent, interdisciplinary research institute at the University of Bonn. With research, teaching and 
political consultancy ZEI takes part in an intensive dialogue between scholarship and society in 
contributing to the resolution of problems of European integration and the development of Eu-
rope´s global role. For further information, see: http://www.zei.de. 
ZEI – DISCUSSION PAPERS are intended to stimulate discussion among researchers, practitioners 
and policy makers on current and emerging issues of European integration and Europe´s global 
role. Each paper has been exposed to an internal discussion within the Center for European Inte-
gration Studies (ZEI) and an external peer review. The papers mostly reflect work in progress. 
For a current list, see the center‘s homepage: http://www.zei.de. 